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ABSTRACT
Gianni Vattimo’s “nihilistic ontology” is immediately distinguished by its resolute 
anti-metaphysics. Thus, instead of what Vattimo construes as the definitive tropes 
of metaphysics, i.e., temporal permanence, necessity, foundationalism, etc., the 
possibility of nihilistic ontology must maintain a critical exigency regarding these 
tropes. According to this imperative, Vattimo seeks to equate nihilistic ontology 
with a hermeneutic ontology. This text examines this equation, attempting to sepa-
rate the continuity between nihilism and hermeneutics, according to the latter’s 
commitment to a variation of anthropocentrism evinced in concepts such as the 
effectivity of the particular content of a history, which in turn belies a nihilism that 
has posited history and man as contingent. Rather, what is at stake in a nihilistic 
ontology, consistent with Vattimo’s reading, is a radically minimal ontology dedi-
cated to the contingency of Being itself, thus excising the privileged ontological 
status of man that characterizes the hermeneutic ontology, a privileging analogous 
to the very metaphysical foundationalism that nihilism is to obviate.
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Resumen 
La “ontología nihilista” de Gianni Vattimo se distingue inmediatamente por su 
antimetafísica acérrima. Así, en lugar de los que Vattimo considera los tropos 
definitivos de la metafísica, i. e. la permanencia temporal, la necesidad, el fundacio-
nalismo, etc., la posibilidad de la ontología nihilista debe mantener una exigencia 
crítica respecto de estos tropos. De acuerdo con este imperativo, Vattimo busca 
equiparar la ontología nihilista con una ontología hermenéutica. Este texto examina 
esta equiparación e intenta separar la continuidad entre nihilismo y hermenéutica, 
de acuerdo con el compromiso de la segunda con una variación del antropocentris-
mo evidenciado en conceptos tales como la efectividad del contenido particular de 
una historia que, a su vez, contradice el nihilismo que ha propuesto a la historia y 
al hombre como contingentes. En lugar de ello, lo que está en juego en la ontología 
nihilista, siguiendo la lectura de Vattimo, es una ontología mínima radical dedica-
da a la contingencia del Ser mismo, que remueve el estatus ontológico privilegiado 
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del hombre, característico de la ontología hermenéutica; un privilegiado análogo a 
la misma metafísica fundacionalista que el nihilismo ha de evitar. 
Palabras clave: G. Vattimo, nihilismo, hermenéutica.
Introduction
Insofar as Gianni Vattimo’s project has maintained hermeneutics 
as a resolute conceptual reference, this gesture may be construed as a 
derivation of the more fecund philosophical decision made for nihilism. 
It is this anterior decision that is immediately incisive in Vattimo’s ex-
position: the petitioning for a thought according to nihilism, the proper 
name itself, in deference to the inimical corollaries this may engender 
vis-à-vis the eikos of philosophical tradition. That the commitment to 
nihilism requires the specificity of a hermeneutics suggests the latter 
may be abstracted as a symptom of nihilism; this symptom pertains 
particularly to the licit possibilities, however provisional, for a phi-
losophy obligated to think with nihilism. 
Vattimo reads nihilism with a gravity, in the nihilistic imperative 
that certain philosophical discourses, to be collated under the nomi-
nation “metaphysics”, are rendered untenable, whilst concomitantly 
proposing a “hermeneutic ontology” (as hermeneutics itself is recapit-
ulated as a “nihilistic ontology” (cf. Vattimo 1997a)) that is to operate 
in place of the now archaic metaphysics. Such an archaism is ascribed 
according to a formulation that will resemble the familiar doxa of any 
so-called postmodernism: metaphysics may be abstracted as a par-
ticular invariant, despite its very mobilization of (non)particular 
invariants; metaphysics will allude to putative certainty and neces-
sity, to “the ultimate foundation in the face of which there can only 
be silence or admiration” (Vattimo 1993 40). Regardless of the gen-
eral orientation of the philosophical discourses that intend to obviate 
metaphysical foundationalism, nihilism may thus be said to attest to 
a degree of theoretical rigour, as it effectuates the elision of ontologies 
unable to posit the acute corollaries precipitated by what for Vattimo 
is, certainly, an event. Nihilism is, as Vattimo will describe it, the “sole 
opportunity” (cf. Vattimo 1991) for thought –it will indicate a cer-
tain genetic that forces thought according to a precise content which 
consists of the absence of any such variant of metaphysical founda-
tionalism. In the spirit of both the acuity and the irregularity of such 
a genetic, Vattimo’s contention is that the precipitate of this event is 
most rigorously mobilized by the hermeneutic current, as the latter 
is recapitulated as bearing a series of concepts analogous to the im-
peratives of a nihilistic ontology. It is this thesis which is to be treated 
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by the following intervention: according to Vattimo’s account of ni-
hilism and the demands it places on philosophical thought, does the 
proposed nihilistic ontology necessarily delimit the possibilities of this 
thought along the lines of a hermeneutic ontology? That is to say, does 
taking nihilism as the closure of metaphysics, thus rendering the lat-
ter’s conceptual apparatus exhausted, entail a movement towards the 
pertinence that Vattimo ascribes to the Heideggerian ontology and its 
variations? Does Vattimo’s hermeneutic ontology effectively actuate 
nihilism’s theoretical possibilities, whilst remaining consistent with 
what he construes as the (in)variant postulates of a radically nihilistic 
ontology? It is this transition from nihilism to hermeneutics -which 
for Vattimo is precisely not a point of transition, and therein evinces 
the notion of hermeneutics as nihilistic symptom- that is to be inter-
rogated in terms of a reading that suggests hermeneutics’ intercalation 
of an anthropic principle into nihilistic ontology that resembles the 
dogmatic metaphysical necessity nihilism attempts to preclude, thus 
belying the terms of the initial decision.
1
Vattimo will seize on two concepts to orient his nihilistic ontolo-
gy: contingency and exigency. The former will describe his conception 
of Being; the latter will describe thought’s relation to Being, viz., an 
ontology conceived as response to this contingency. It is these two 
concepts that, for Vattimo, affirm the continuity of hermeneutics to 
nihilism in the form of a certain symptomatology. 
A logic of the employment of these two concepts may be located 
in Vattimo’s The End of Modernity, in the adduction that the status of 
nihilism is incomplete, whilst the genetic it intimates is to be conceived 
as heteroclite. Nihilism as concept, or movement, is described as na-
scent, in a hypothesis that will recall Heidegger’s moments of hesitation 
towards a comprehensive account of nihilism (cf. Heidegger 1977), with 
a conjunction that nevertheless affirms the latter’s significance vis-à-vis 
philosophy. Vattimo will caution that “nihilism is still developing and 
it is impossible to draw any definitive conclusions about it” (1991 19). 
Accordingly, following this description of nihilism’s incompleteness, 
Vattimo offers the following denotation: “Nihilism signifies here what 
it means for Nietzsche in the note found at the beginning of the first 
edition of The Will to Power; the situation in which ‘man rolls from 
the centre toward X’” (1991 19). What Vattimo omits in his citation of 
Nietzsche clarifies the intent of the original remark, as the prefatory 
“Since Copernicus” coincides nihilism with the acute historical dis-
placement from a centre (that for Vattimo is resolutely metaphysical 
in its notion of an invariant), the latter evincing the incompleteness 
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of nihilism in two senses: that this displacement is ongoing and that 
the X is unknown. The dual structure of the concession of this incom-
pleteness is pertinent in its indication of Vattimo’s imperative of what 
is ontologically licit for thought. There is an inscription of an exigency 
at stake in the reading of nihilism determined by the very construal 
of the incompleteness as indicative of a hiatus– insofar as nihilism is 
regarded as incomplete, nihilism itself is only to be posited in terms 
of the particularity of a history, viz., the immanence of Vattimo’s ni-
hilistic thought to the displacement from metaphysics described in 
Nietzsche’s Copernicanism. Thus, whilst the displacement is con-
tinuous, implying that its significance is to be posited as incomplete, 
the genetic of nihilism forces a thinking that is delimited according 
to a critical exigency to metaphysics, as nihilism is precisely to be 
read against these invariants of metaphysics. Hence, the various syn-
tagms found throughout Vattimo’s writings, such as “weak thought” 
and “ontology of actuality”, may be recapitulated as the movement of 
thought against metaphysical particulars, against putative invariants 
now to be thought as variants: the genetic at stake here is one that 
departs from and retroactively critiques the “topological” certainty 
that Nietzsche’s Copernicanism has elided, i.e., the actuality of the 
immediate effectivity of the Copernican uranology itself. 
Vattimo’s notion of exigency thinks the cursory status of nihilism 
according to metaphysics as historical, for metaphysics is possessive of 
a history, despite its postulation of invariants, as nihilism effectuates 
metaphysics’ historical status through the positing of the finitude of 
the latter’s putative ground evinced in the Copernican uranology. It 
is this dissolution of metaphysics on the grounds of the affirmation of 
its historical particularity that is to anticipate hermeneutics’ implicit 
continuity to nihilism. Vattimo’s thesis that postmodern thought is in-
dicative of a “hermeneutic koine” denotes a contemporary philosophical 
ubiquity of hermeneutics, one that Vattimo equates to the shift nomi-
nated by nihilism. Such koine “describes an overall climate, a general 
sensibility, or simply a kind of presupposition that everyone feels more 
or less obliged to take into account” (Vattimo 1997a 1). The notion that 
hermeneutics in Vattimo’s account has become the putative inclination 
of contemporary philosophical thought pace metaphysics nevertheless 
possesses a marked detrimental effect: if a hermeneutic symptom may 
be read as traversing a disparate series of philosophical texts, this in-
dicates that hermeneutics is precluded from any theoretical rigour it 
may have possessed: “Hermeneutics defined so broadly [...] ends up 
as something innocuous, worthless even” (Ibid). The continuity of 
hermeneutics to nihilism therefore would not merely coincide with 
the latter’s perceived ubiquity against some anterior metaphysics, as 
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this would belie the alterity of a nihilistic ontology. Rather, to radi-
calize hermeneutics against the nugatory consequences of the koine, 
Vattimo will suggest that hermeneutics must return to the acute theo-
retical shift proposed by nihilism, i.e., the absence of foundationalism, 
of which hermeneutics is symptomatic. Hermeneutics is not inhibited 
because of the incompleteness of nihilism; the latter remains incom-
plete only insofar as it is abstracted as the immanence of thought to the 
decision for metaphysics’ insufficiency.
It is thus for Vattimo the Nietzschean syntagm of “everything 
is an interpretation, yet this too is an interpretation” which is to be 
regarded as the definitive statement of hermeneutic ontology’s con-
tinuity with nihilism. The latter part of the syntagm radicalizes 
hermeneutics against the obscurity threatened by the vulgarization 
of the koine, whilst concomitantly delimiting the terms of the move-
ment away from metaphysics: the hermeneutic symptom that Vattimo 
reads across contemporary philosophy, is itself an interpretation:
If hermeneutics is not accepted as a comfortable metatheory of 
the universality of interpretative phenomena, as a sort of view from 
nowhere of the perennial conflict, or play, of interpretations, the (only, 
I believe) alternative is to think the philosophy of interpretation as the 
final stage in a series of events (theories, vast social and cultural trans-
formations, technologies and scientific ‘discoveries’), as the conclusion 
of a history we feel unable to tell (interpret) except in the terms of ni-
hilism that we find for the first time in Nietzsche. (Vattimo 1997a 8)
As the proposed hermeneutic symptomatology to nihilism is 
realized according to the precise content of this exigency qua anti-
metaphysics, this entails a hermeneuticization of the hermeneutic 
thesis itself. The ubiquity that is the koine cannot re-inscribe itself as 
centre; it cannot repeat the tropes of metaphysics. The conversion of 
the ubiquity of interpretation into a type of faktum would only suspend 
hermeneutics’ nihilistic actuality, demarcating a regress into the archa-
ic form of metaphysics that nihilism as event has rendered theoretically 
insufficient. Rather, insofar as nihilism denotes a collapsing of various 
metaphysical discourses of necessity and centres, substituted by the 
recapitulation of these discourses as interpretations, the Nietzschean 
fragment preserves hermeneutics’ distance from metaphysics through 
the stressing of hermeneutics’ general theory of interpretation as an 
interpretation immanent to its historical actuality. Moreover, to avoid 
the construal of the hermeneutic thesis as merely a form of theoretical 
underdeterminism in its prima facie delineation of an entirely in-
noxious thesis according to the apparent internal derision of its own 
ontological claims, the recovery of hermeneutics’ theoretical rigour 
resides in its utilization of metaphysical (in) variants as its immanent 
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historical material, in opposition to the hermeneutic ontology itself 
denoting some trans or a-historical invariant. 
Hence this (what may be termed) “weak thesis” of a certain 
Pyrrhonian type (in its proposal of a theory of interpretation that is 
itself an interpretation) coincides with a “strong thesis” that stipulates 
a temporalization of all ontologies. Exigencies are actuated by the con-
cession of the Pyrrhonian nature of the hermeneutic ontology, thus 
temporalizing the latter on what may provisionally be termed a “par-
ticular level” (i.e., the hermeneutic koine as a particular exigency to 
nihilism’s Copernican displacement), whilst also postulating a tem-
poralization on a “universal level”, viz., metaphysics, hermeneutics, 
any of these various ontological discourses are particularities. In these 
terms, the problematic at stake in the possibility of a nihilistic ontology 
is one of the proper account of temporality: against a-historical neces-
sary universals, Vattimo’s nihilistic temporality invokes the possibility 
of ontology according to particular, finite and contingent exigencies. 
The weak and strong theses codification via the problem of tempo-
rality prefigures Vattimo’s ontological decision for Heidegger. In these 
terms, it is thus lucid that for Vattimo nihilism is primarily “a geschich-
tlich problem in the sense of the connection made by Heidegger between 
Geschichte and Gecihck” (1991 19). The utilization of Heideggerian 
historicity and facticity to subvert metaphysics’ approach to ontology 
collapses any ontology’s possibility into the genetic of finite historical 
throwness, in line with Vattimo’s strong thesis. Thus, particulars are 
transient; they will occur and cease, therein delimiting the remit of ni-
hilistic ontology: “a fundamental weakening of being, in which being is 
not, but happens” (Vattimo 1993 73). Vattimo’s reliance on Heidegger’s 
ontology actuates Being against metaphysics, in order to fully recapitu-
late the conceptual shift at stake in nihilistic ontology: according to the 
ontological priority attributed to the contingency of the particularity of 
what happens as opposed to the necessity that is the universal of what 
is, Vattimo will posit an isomorphy of Being and Event. Nevertheless, 
while noting that Heidegger did not explicitly offer such a formulation, 
Vattimo’s isomorphy bears a type analogous to Heidegger’s account of 
Being and Ereignis: 
Being is not to be understood as an objective datum that precedes 
the application of “conceptual schemes” [...] we can speak of Being only 
at the level of the events in which the ever-varying modes that struc-
ture the world of human historical experience are instituted. Being is 
not an object, it is the aperture within which alone man and the world, 
subject and object, can enter into relation [...] Being should be thought 
of as an event. (Vattimo 2007 6)
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Vattimo, following Heidegger, excises the ontic metaphysical in-
clination towards presence, through the delineation of this presence as 
the corollary of an anterior ontogenesis. Ontogenesis as aperture sug-
gests the latter’s double denotation as both opening and gap: it disrupts 
the putative consistency of metaphysical types of ontology through the 
interruption of the invariant givenness of the object, whilst serving as 
an opening that will make licit the possibility of givenness as such. The 
objectivity of any datum presupposes some metaphysical necessity and 
permanence in its occlusion of “happening” itself; in contrast, nihil-
ism thinks this objectivity as an instance of contingency in the very 
non-necessary possibility of its happening. That is, ontogenesis’ aper-
turic status denotes this contingency, in that “what happens” cannot be 
thought in terms of a reference to a given objectivity, as this would pri-
oritize the latter over the anteriority of ontogenesis, thus inversing the 
ascribed corollary: insofar as the sequence at stake in nihilistic ontology 
is ontogenesis’ anteriority to the ascribing of ontological objectivities, 
the former must be thought as a contingency in the particularity and 
non-objectivity of “what happens”. It is this commitment to the con-
tingency of ontogenesis that will delineate the acuity of nihilistic 
ontology’s exigency, with the proviso that the commitment to this 
ontogenesis entails, as the strong thesis denotes: ontology itself is 
an instance of ontogenesis. This does not imply that any ontology is 
merely enclosed in the remit of its own ontogenesis. Being as Event 
does not occur within a void; nor does it occur as Vattimo notes, among 
“objects” that precede ontogenesis; events occur among events. This plu-
rality of events evinced in the notion of “evental level” recalls Vattimo’s 
allusion to nihilism as problem of Heideggerian historicity: a particular 
ontogenesis emerges as immanent to a heterogeneous series of particu-
lar ontogeneses, thus engendering the differentiation (the every varying 
modes) of a history. The particularity of Being as Event entails an 
ontology dedicated to the singularity of being in its “happening”, nev-
ertheless to the degree that theses events occur amongst events, the 
positing of ontogenesis is necessarily co-determined by the context of 
its appearance among other events, which in themselves are contin-
gent; in other words, nihilism is a Heideggerian type of historicitical 
problem as the reduction to Being as Event is a reduction towards the 
ligation of the finite particularity of ontogenesis to other such isomor-
phic ontogeneses. 
This emphasis on ontogenesis in Vattimo’s nihilistic ontology be-
come more acute when thought in contrast to a metaphysics that is 
structural and eternal (a thought in contrast which is de jure necessary, 
according to Vattimo’s imperative for nihilism’s critical exigency), the 
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latter description as derived from his readings of both Heidegger and 
Nietzsche: 
Now, what Heidegger calls “metaphysics” is precisely the idea that 
being is order objectively given once and for all, that also Nietzsche re-
proaches to Socrates, seeing in him the beginner of modern decadence, 
guilty of having killed the great tragic spirit of the ancients. If being is 
a stable structure given once and for all, there is no possible openness 
in history nor any freedom. (Vattimo 1997b 1)
The permanence of Being initiates the obfuscation of the problem 
of temporalization in terms of a teleology that bars the appearance of 
these singularities, here abstracted as history and freedom, eliding Being 
as event’s contingency, particularity and heterogeneity. Ontogenesis is 
vitiated of its differentiating status as event, according to the putatively 
posited eternality of structure that has pre hoc occluded evental pos-
sibility. Temporal permanence will obscure the contingency of the 
event, through a suspension of the latter via a teleology that vitiates the 
possibility of a being extrinsic to its remit, therefore ascribing the event 
as object according to an overdetermination that is inherent to an ac-
count of temporality qua pure presence. In contrast, the commitment 
to Being as Event will engender the «narrative» status of metaphysics, 
insofar as metaphysics’ theoretical inclination is realized as entirely 
thetic: its illusory infinite temporality is punctured by the nihilistic 
Being as Event, as the «good hermeneutician» in consistency with 
nihilism is implored to occlude structural stability, allowing for the 
possibility of radical contingencies and their finitude ligated to partic-
ular historical situations as given through the necessary relationality 
posited between events. 
The terms of nihilistic ontology may thus be recapitulated as 
follows:
a. The weak or Pyrrhonian thesis of hermeneutic ontology, whilst 
postulating an eikos of interpretation in “post-metaphysics” that in-
dexes the insufficiencies of metaphysics, concomitantly evinces the 
strong thesis of temporality. Nihilism introduces a particular con-
ception of time, which will posit ontologies themselves as events, i.e., 
contingent, particular and finite; as such, any ontology is described 
as an event, yet nevertheless determined by its particularity in that it 
is immanent to other events. Thus, the ontology of ontogenesis is an 
instance of ontogenesis itself.
b. The strong thesis proposes a radically minimal ontology. What 
Vattimo terms “weak ontology” evinces this minimal ontology, in that 
Vattimo will seek to index ontogenesis –ontological thought is obligat-
ed to what appears, what occurs, rather than what is. Thus, thought’s 
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genetic is posited as a beginning from this minimal appearance of being, 
as opposed to metaphysics’ maximal ontology, i.e., thinking through 
the pre-given eternal structures and the putative notion of ontic per-
manence. Being as Event will rather denote the bare minimum of the 
contingent and particular singularity ligated, according to the strong 
thesis, to other isomorphic types, engendering the exigency between 
events and thus, the notion of a history: viz., the minimal point of this 
ontology is the thinking of the appearance of an event as ligated to the 
purely evental context of its appearance.
2
To further develop the above premises, Vattimo’s reading of ni-
hilistic ontology and metaphysics’ respective treatment of truth is 
apposite on two tiers. First, it recapitulates again the critical exigency 
of the tenets of the nihilistic ontology posited against the tenets of 
metaphysics; second, an account of truth is deemed necessary for 
hermeneutics to not merely be abstracted as a non-rigorous ontology 
of relativism, thus repeating the innoxiousness of the hermeneutic 
koine. Vattimo does not discard truth for the sake of actuating ni-
hilism’s heterogeneity to metaphysics, but rather shifts the account 
of truth into one complicit with his minimal ontology. The concern 
here is not an evaluation of Vattimo’s account of truth, but rather the 
utilization of the latter to recapitulate nihilistic ontology, as truth 
essentially is to function as a conceptual analogue for the minimal 
ontology conceived as Being as Event.
In consistency with nihilism’s critical exigency against meta-
physics, Vattimo will describe truth via the latter’s vitiation: “for 
hermeneutics [...] truth is not primarily the conformity of statement 
to thing, but the opening with which every conformity or deformity 
can come about. The opening is not a stable, transcendental structure 
of reason, but a legacy, the finite-historical throwness” (1997a 16). The 
critique of metaphysical truth as conformity between what may be 
termed the classical philosophical distinction between logos (here for 
Vattimo “statement”) and physis (“thing”) recapitulates the motifs of an 
eternal structurality indicative of metaphysics: the possibility of con-
formity presupposes the dyadic eternal objectivity of logos and physis. 
Thus, the correspondence approach to truth, summarized as “the in-
controvertible givenness of the thing, fostered by a suitable strategy 
of approach” (Vattimo 1997a 75), is problematic insofar as the thing 
is posited as eternal, as is the strategic discourse used to address it; 
the metaphysical notion of “thing”, putatively postulated as eternal-
structural presumes the latter quality. Moreover, insofar as conformity 
is what is at stake in metaphysics, this conformity presupposes the 
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possibility of a strategy that would necessarily be qualitatively iden-
tical to the structural eternality of the thing; the possibility of their 
eternal convertibility will engender truth. 
Metaphysical truth therefore operates through the putative positing 
of the invariant status of its object, ligated to the possibility of an in-
variant of its statement. Insofar as nihilism’s exigency is described as 
effacing putative metaphysical positions, in the case of truth this will 
suggest the obviation of the eternal-structural duality at the heart of 
metaphysics’ account of the latter, through a finite historical throwness 
that is explicitly demonstrative of an anti-metaphysical conception of 
temporality. The utilization of the Heideggerian syntagm of finite his-
torical throwness thus functions as a conceptual analogue for the bare 
minimum of the ligation of Being and Event: the contingent singularity 
of throwness eventuates within a “historical situation”, denoting the 
exigency that co-determines the singularity. The minimal ontology 
will elide metaphysics’ eternal structurality through the nihilistic de-
cision in favour of the latter’s finite temporalization (evinced in the 
aforementioned strong thesis); as such, the Heideggerian influenced 
positing of the anteriority of ontogenesis in terms of “opening” reca-
pitulates metaphysics itself (its statement and its putative “access” to 
the eternality of the thing) as an instance of the former. To the degree 
that finite historical throwness delineates the conditions of possibility 
for metaphysical discourse, metaphysics qua discourse itself is deter-
mined in the last instance by this bare minimum of Being as Event.
Accordingly, Vattimo’s account bears the familiar resemblance to 
the certain transcendental tradition of the identification of more orig-
inary conditions; in this case, the appropriation of the Heideggerian 
emphasis on the minimum of ontogenesis as opposed to the putative 
constancy of the ontic is used to usurp metaphysics –the conditional 
sequencing coincides truth with ontogenesis, as Vattimo is concerned 
with “the first condition of every particular truth” (Vattimo 1997a 82). 
However, the conditionality for truth at stake in the series of con-
ceptual analogues that determine the minimal ontology again here 
differs, as Vattimo notes in the utilization of the metaphor of dwelling 
to describe this first condition: 
[T]he truth of the opening can, it seems, only be thought on the basis 
of the metaphor of dwelling [...] It is “dwelling” that is the first condition of 
my saying the truth. But I cannot describe it as a universal a structural and 
stable condition for historical experience (and lately that of the history 
of science as well) evinces the irreducibility of heterogeneous paradigms 
and cultural universes, and moreover in order to describe the opening as a 
stable structure, I would need a criterion of conformity, which would then 
be the more original opening. (Vattimo 1997a 82)
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Despite the opening’s appearance of condition, it is not to be con-
strued as a stable structure, alluding to the classical type employed 
by metaphysics. Whilst the condition of the opening is invariant, the 
latter must be thought in terms of the ontogenesis posited qua Being 
as Event, which, in contrast to dogmatic metaphysical necessity, is 
construed as contingent, particular and finite. Thus Vattimo, whilst 
employing conditionality to displace metaphysics, will stress the con-
tingency of the minimal ontology’s conditions; insofar as the exigency 
of his ontology is to Being as Event, the irreducibility of this con-
dition cannot be ascribed as universal constant. Finite openings are 
co-constituted by their relation to other events, to the throwness into 
history that delimits the conditionality according to which the singu-
larity must be thought; nevertheless, this conditionality, rather than a 
universal, is in each case “particular”; it is the relation of events to events, 
of dwellings to dwellings, of openings to openings, which describes the 
ontogenesis as always contingent, and thus particularizes exigencies of 
thought. That is, to the degree that the exigency postulated in the strong 
thesis temporalizes all conditions, the latter necessarily implies an al-
terity; Vattimo thus is to particularize conditionality, rendering these 
conditions heterogeneous. Hence, whereas Vattimo concedes that finite 
historical throwness may to a certain degree be viewed as a variation of 
a Kantian a priori conditions (Vattimo 1997a), it is Heidegger’s analytic 
of Dasein that effaces this prima facie resemblance, according to the 
particularity of each instance of Being as Event, i.e., the particularity 
of an instance of finite historical throwness. The conditions are posited 
as a minimum according to ontogenesis; moreover, this ontogenesis 
is radically variant, according to the contingency of the precise con-
tents of this bare minimum of Being qua condition (finitude, history, 
language, the irreducibility of ontogeneses’ appearance within “het-
erogeneous paradigms and cultural universes”), therefore suggesting 
the heterogeneity of any particular ontology assaying to describe this 
ontogenesis, alongside the heterogeneity of this ontogenesis itself. 
With the clear tropes that are to distinguish metaphysics and 
nihilism, the index of Vattimo’s acuity in his account may be clearly 
interrogated: is Vattimo’s minimal ontology sufficiently heteroge-
neous and contingent to satisfy the commitment to nihilism? In a 
more direct polemical engagement with Vattimo’s exposition, the 
question may be posed as follows: insofar as the minimal ontology 
begins from a ligation of the ontogenesis that is radically contingent 
to the context of other events, to a history that determines thought’s 
exigency, does this not intimate a necessary structure according to the 
intercalation of the latter? This is the crux of the entire re-conception 
of nihilism against metaphysics, and why truth is exemplary of the 
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problem: if the historical particularity within which the ontogenesis 
appears is construed as conditioning ontogenesis via the relation that 
is its exigency to extrinsic modalities, this would re-inscribe a meta-
physical motif into the account of the nihilistic ontology, through 
the intercalation of a type, however weak, of structure, indicated by 
the necessity which the contingent ontogenesis is co-determined by. 
That is, from the perspective of the ontogenesis and ontology itself, 
which become inseparable in Vattimo’s account, does the stipulation 
of exigency to the particularities of a history not infer an ineluctable 
necessity? (In this case, particularities are specific in their reference 
to e.g., a particular linguistic-historical context evinced in finite 
historical throwness, e.g., the immanence of thought to a historical 
actuality, viz., nihilism to the displacement from metaphysics.) 
Insofar as the logic of Vattimo’s recusal consists in the notion that 
the structure itself is a particular, this gesture inheres to a shift of “neces-
sity” and “structure” to the particular, thus occluding, in Vattimo’s view, 
a metaphysical motif, as these particularities do not make any pretense 
to the universal, even though necessity and structure remain extant. The 
“not stable a-structurality” of these conditions persists insofar as they 
vary according to particularities; any two particularities, since they are 
posited as heterogeneous and irreducible, would be deemed radically 
disparate enough to preclude the motif of invariant structure across par-
ticulars. Thus, the particularity of an ontogenesis or an ontology within, 
e.g. ancient Scythia, or within e.g., the Napoleonic wars are deemed as 
heterogeneous enough to preclude a universality of this bare minimum 
of ontogenesis and the ligation to its context. Being qua Event thinks the 
continuity of history, denoted in Vattimo’s usage of the term “legacy”, and 
the discontinuity that is the contingent ontogenesis as ligated, therein 
obviating the structural consistency of Kantian conditionality through 
minimizing metaphysics’ maximal stable structurality, whilst thinking the 
latter as a particular condition and thus, as the bare minimum of a partic-
ular genetic. In other words, to subvert metaphysical trappings, Vattimo’s 
account incurs a division on the level of form and content; It is the acute 
content of a particular that evinces an alterity to another particular, i.e., 
the specific “information” that constitutes the throwness (an event) into 
a history (the other events, the other instances of “what has happened”), 
its initial conditionality. However, the forms of these particulars are in 
themselves entirely isomorphic: finite historical throwness is a syntagm 
that abstracts all particulars of Being as Event. That the content of Being 
as Event varies, differentiating the precise content of the “conditions”, is 
sufficient for Vattimo to preclude the conflation of his minimal ontology 
with Kantian conditions, since their particularity renders any condition 
heterogeneous, nevertheless the form of the ontogenesis traverses any 
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particular, i.e., Vattimo’s strong thesis as the very positing of an isomor-
phy of form vis-a-vis particulars heterogeneous in their content.
Yet, insofar as the strong thesis of temporalization demarcates a 
necessary relation for ontogenesis, the alternative antithesis becomes 
acute, as what remains open here is the question of why the particular 
history that co-determines the singularity of ontogenesis/ontology itself 
is not posited as contingent, thus excising its determinate, structural 
status. Vattimo’s decision is that ontogenesis is inseparable from its 
ligation to the history of its appearance: it can not be excised from this 
history, insofar as events appear in relation to events, and thus the pos-
sibility of “what happens” and the ontology of the latter are irreducibly 
linked. Since Vattimo rejects Being as Event occurring within a void, 
or Being as Event occurring amidst already existing objects, Being as 
Event must occur in relation to other events. However, the corollary of 
this decision is that it belies the very radical contingency that Vattimo 
describes is at stake in the transition from dogmatic metaphysics to 
nihilism. The minimal ontology’s proposal of a necessary relation be-
tween a particular ontogenesis and what constitutes its dwelling, i.e., 
the content of its history, introduces nihilistic thought as inseparable 
from the particularity of its history, despite the contingency of the 
latter itself: this history is simultaneously posited as contingent and 
necessary. Thus, although a particular ontogenesis is not a necessary ef-
fect of the evental level, i.e., it is contingent, as is the evental level itself, 
the particularity of what happens is thought according to a necessity 
ascribed to the contingent evental level. Using Vattimo’s own impera-
tive against metaphysics, the regression here into the latter is intimated 
insofar as this historicity is thought in terms of a homology of contin-
gency and necessity. Thus, an appearance within Ancient Scythia is 
radically contingent; however, the precise content of Ancient Scythia, 
just as its various normativities, denote a structure for this ontogen-
esis itself in the latter’s barred separation from its context, and any 
ontology itself therefore is rendered inseparable from what amounts 
to the pure doxa of this context. This hidden necessity at stake in the 
prioritization of the temporal and thought’s necessary exigency to a 
historical particular, despite the latter’s posited contingency, denotes 
an ambiguity in the commitment towards a nihilistic ontology, an 
ambiguity specifically engendered through Vattimo’s intercalation of 
motifs consistent with and derived from Heideggerian ontology into 
the incompleteness of nihilism. That is, whilst Vattimo posits the con-
tingency of historicity, the latter’s content is re-inscribed as a faktum 
that denotes the exigency of thought’s possibilities, thus betraying the 
decision for nihilism through a decision for Heidegger. 
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The problematic of historicity’s dual necessity and contingency 
is, in essence, an avoidable conflation. As Alain Badiou has noted, the 
concession of the contingency of historicity suggests philosophy’s un-
binding from its own historicity. As Ray Brassier acutely recapitulates 
Badiou’s position:
It is precisely by acknowledging the aleatory contingency of its 
historicity […] that philosophy frees itself from the myth of its uncir-
cumventable historical destination, whether the latter be construed in 
terms of an ineluctable progress according to ‘the History of Spirit’, or 
that of an irrecusable decline according to the “history of Metaphysics”. 
(Brassier 2004 51-52)
Whilst Badiou’s remark is intended for temporalities qua teleolo-
gies, resembling Vattimo’s denotation of metaphysics that his nihilistic 
ontology assays to critique, the contingency of history is wholly ger-
mane to the transcendental-finite tradition that Vattimo appropriates 
vis-à-vis the demands of a nihilism. That is, whereas Vattimo rejects 
teleologies, teleology is replaced by the notion of the exigency of phi-
losophy as a response to the specific historical particularity of nihilism 
contra historicity as teleology, thus intercalating a fundamental limit-
ing remit that has already been posited as contingent: finite-historical 
throwness as denotative of nihilism’s minimal ontology will confuse, 
in a lack of theoretical ascesis, the apparent contingency of the singu-
larity of ontogenesis with other necessary ontogeneses. In contrast, if 
this nihilistic ontology follows through in its positing of its own histo-
ricity as contingent, what is elided is the necessary exigency to its own 
history, a history that, in the specific case of metaphysics, nihilistic 
thought has already posited as contingent. Vattimo’s positing of the 
denouement of metaphysics becomes a theoretically radical position, 
insofar as he concomitantly separates the possibility of ontological 
thought from the particular content of its exigency, i.e., the equivoca-
tion of Being as Event and the historical as a particular and necessary 
content, viz., the historical context into which one is thrown. The pos-
iting of the contingency of this appearance in its most radical sense 
demands an excision of the historical from this minimal ontology, as 
history is to be posited as contingent in both its form and content, as 
opposed to the particularities of the latter determining ontogenesis 
and collapsing ontology into the necessity of a content: viz., nihilism 
without dogmatic metaphysical contamination would suspend the ef-
fectivity of history’s content, realizing this history itself, in affinity 
with Nietzsche’s syntagm, as merely a “history of corruptions”.
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Conclusion
If the decision to radicalize nihilism on the grounds of temporality 
 construed as history, despite the latter’s contingency, may be said to in-
tercalate an undesired metaphysical structure into Vattimo’s nihilism, 
the terms of this gesture’s belying of nihilistic ontology become more 
acute when thought as symptomatic of a certain humanism. This symp-
tom can be read in Vattimo’s commentary on Nietzsche’s Copernicanism, 
which forces centres and necessities for man to be obviated by a hetero-
clite movement of displacement and a commitment of thought to this 
displacement itself. Vattimo will not efface the figure of man; he will 
instead attempt to provide a certain (a)topology of its displacement. 
Prima facie, this humanism in Vattimo is undesired. The End of 
Modernity will discuss nihilism and the “dedivinization of man”; it will 
delimit a postmodern condition as the metaphysical displacement of 
man. Thus, Nietzsche’s Copernicanism does not address the “human 
subject alone at the psychological or sociological level” (Vattimo 1991 20), 
but rather, as man’s displacement is linked to the question of Being 
(Vattimo 1991 20), at an ontological level. Nevertheless, insofar as the 
ontological status of man ascribed by nihilism is that of a contingent on-
togenesis ligated to an account of temporality qua historicity, this will be 
analogous to the intercalation of a certain anthropic principle, as man 
will exercise a simultaneous underdetermination and overdetermina-
tion within nihilistic ontology: in the case of the former, all ontologies 
are human interpretations, therefore there is no hermeneutic distinction 
between ontologies; in the case of the latter, the overdetermination lies 
in the conceptual analogues of history, language, culture, and finitude 
which condition any possible ontology. This duality of underdetermina-
tion and overdetermination thus seeks to displace the necessity of the 
discourse of and for man, whilst at the same time hypostatizing “man” 
and its conceptual analogues as the unsurpassable Real of thought: man 
is consecrated as the necessary being of ontology, as for the Heidegger of 
Being and Time, according to the one that posits the question in the first 
instance. As a consequence, this decision surprisingly recasts ontology as 
a metaphysical type codified by a permanence assigned to man: the lat-
ter’s ontological status is posited as contingent, however any ontology itself 
is rendered particular according to the presence of man as the universal 
ground of ontology. 
Nevertheless, if man is not posited as the beginning of ontology in 
the first instance but rather this contingency is used to ontologize man in 
the last instance, the dedivinization of man within a nihilistic ontology
becomes plausible. This distinction of in the first instance and in the 
last instance suggests that the latter will recast the apparent genetic 
of ontology as beginning from man, according to the extrapolation 
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of this beginning in terms of the contingency of this beginning itself: 
viz., if the nihilistic ontology concedes the contingency of history, and 
thus occludes its determining status, the concomitant gesture is thus 
the separation of thought from what may be termed these very nor-
mativities of the anthropic. What remains open in Vattimo’s account, 
and what is arguably most compelling in this account, is the possibility 
of the minimal ontology without reliance on the normativities of the 
anthropic, whether historical, cultural, etc.,. Insofar as Vattimo mobi-
lizes the concepts of contingency and exigency, what becomes incisive 
is the possible assays of a nihilistic ontology that is finally elided of a 
privileged, utterly metaphysical status ascribed to man:
a. Vattimo’s minimal ontology, as vitiated of man, forces the no-
tion of thinking of “what happens” without reference to anthropic 
temporality, i.e., history, and the topological certainty of this refer-
ence, which has already been rendered theoretically insufficient by 
Nietzsche’s Copernicanism. Ontogenesis is thus a-historical, yet it 
is nevertheless “what happens”. Being as event would therefore be 
conceived as a contingency, however a radicalized contingency in 
that there is no conception of time to ground the appearance of this 
contingency in terms of an anthropic remit (i.e., the ligation of onto-
genesis and the particular history). Rather what is delineated here is a 
heterogeneous series of Events, heterogeneous in the sense that once 
anthropic temporality is excised from the ligation of ontogenesis, 
ontogenesis is not anthropomorphized: the positing of this contin-
gency is thus not merely the contingency of history, of anthropic 
temporality, but rather is indicative of the collapsing of the ontologi-
cal separation of man and non-man, through ontogenesis taken in its 
strongest sense, viz., precluding it from being re-formulated as merely 
an anthropogenesis.
b. What remains for the exigency that determines an ontology is 
precisely the exigency to this contingency. The exigency that forces 
thought without time, man or any variation of metaphysical necessity 
would be an exigency to a contingency that is the actuality consti-
tuting the bare minimum of the minimal ontology. The genetic here 
is not the precise content of metaphysics, i.e., various foundations, 
but rather, the contingency of these foundations, thus suffusing the 
latter with contingency itself, as opposed to a determination by the 
precise content of a particular. Vattimo’s attempt to make thought 
immanent to its actuality (viz., ontology as ontogenesis itself), posits 
an immanence of thought to the precise content of metaphysics; to 
elide the humanistic motifs that over and under determine ontology, 
the immanence of ontological thought is needed to be posited vis-à-
vis the contingency which renders metaphysics itself as a particular. 
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Once the anthropic series of conceptual analogues are precluded, the 
condition of nihilism, which forces thought, is the condition of con-
tingency: viz., insofar as nihilism does not denote a sociological or 
psychological commentary of man, what is required is the reciprocal 
de-anthropologization of nihilism. It is according to this excision of 
man that nihilistic ontology is ascribed its most radical possibility: 
what is nascent is an aperture for an entirely heteroclite account of 
Being and Being as Event, its relationality, non-relationality, the for-
mation or non-formation of the context of an evental level, etc.; an 
account effectuated by the minimum that is ontology’s immanence to 
contingency, the exigency to the contingency of Being itself.
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